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INTRODUCTION
Traditional non-cash payment systems are built around a complex sys-
tem of financial intermediaries.  In these systems, payments require both
the payer and payee to have deposit accounts with an intermediary (such
as a bank).  The movement of money from the payer to the payee involves
a process called settlement1 that results in the payment amount being deb-
ited from the payer’s balance and that same amount being credited to the
payee’s balance.  On an operational level, settlement requires in-
termediaries to communicate with each other to adjust the balances of
their internal ledgers and decide on a set of rules and procedures that
dictate when payments are final and how disputes will be resolved.  In
essence, traditional payment systems require users to trust third party in-
termediaries to manage a complex, centralized settlement process.2
It was in this context that Bitcoin, a revolutionary new consumer pay-
ment system3 based on disintermediation, was invented.  Bitcoin sought to
exclude banks and other financial intermediaries from the settlement pro-
1. Settlement, the conceptual engine that drives all payments, is “an act that dis-
charges obligations . . . between two or more parties.” COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SET-
TLEMENT SYSTEMS, A Glossary of Terms Used in Payments and Settlement Systems, BANK
FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 45, (Mar. 2003) http://www.bis.org/cpmi/glos-
sary_030301.pdf.  The fundamental purpose of all payment systems, regardless of the method,
is to facilitate settlement between parties. Indeed, the historical development of payment
instruments and systems can be traced to innovations in the conceptual, operational, and
legal frameworks that allowed settlement to become more efficient, secure, and/or accessible
over time. In early payment methods like gold or cash, settlement was achieved through the
physical transfer of money from the payer to the payee. Ina cash transaction, for example,
the payer’s payment obligation to the payee is discharged upon the payee’s physical posses-
sion of the currency. The problems involved in moving large amounts of physical money,
however, spurred the development of a new conceptual model of settlement through deposit
banking. In this model, obligations between parties could be settled by adjusting the parties’
bank deposit balances, rather than requiring the physical movement of money. From this
conceptual framework flowed operational and legal innovation that allowed such deposit-
oriented payment instruments and systems to evolve from the humble paper check to elec-
tronic funds transfers (e.g. ACH, Fedwire), payment cards, and modern peer-to-peer applica-
tions (e.g. PayPal, Venmo).
2. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
BITCOIN.ORG, 1 (2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
3. Bitcoin has another important use that its creator did not anticipate—an alterna-
tive investment vehicle. As bitcoin prices continue to rise, bitcoin has become an alternative
asset class. While the rise of bitcoin as a new investment vehicle raises many important issues,
they are beyond the scope of this paper as it focuses only on Bitcoin’s use as a consumer
payment system.
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cess.4  Bitcoin’s founder envisioned a new paradigm of decentralized set-
tlement in which transactions were settled collectively by the users
themselves on a publicly distributed ledger, rather than unilaterally by in-
termediaries on their own private ledgers.  Instead of having a deposit ac-
count with an intermediary, a Bitcoin user could create and manage her
own “personal wallet.”  This wallet would serve as her own personal
bitcoin “bank” through which she can create her own accounts to receive
and send bitcoins. Bitcoin’s founder reasoned that, by excluding in-
termediaries, Bitcoin would function purely as a peer-to-peer digital ana-
logue of physical cash and would obviate the need to deal with tricky loss
allocation or dispute mediation issues involving intermediaries.  Ulti-
mately, this exclusion would lower transaction costs for all of the users on
the Bitcoin network.5
An interesting development, however, has occurred over the past few
years.  As Bitcoin started to witness an explosive growth in mainstream
and casual adoption, more and more users—consumers and merchants
alike—moved away from personal wallets and have begun using “hosted
wallet services” provided by third-party intermediaries. Through these
hosted wallet services, intermediaries manage their users’ bitcoin wallets
and facilitate transactions on their behalf.  These services appeal to new
and mainstream users because the services greatly lower the learning
curve for using Bitcoin and reduce the time and energy involved in con-
ducting routine transactions with bitcoin.  These intermediaries not only
streamlined the Bitcoin experience, but also fundamentally altered both
the underlying transaction mechanics and the way risk of loss is spread
throughout the participants of the system.
This paper examines a phenomenon largely overlooked in existing
literature: as Bitcoin matures into a mainstream consumer payments sys-
tem with the rise of intermediation and hosted wallet services, it is slowly
transforming from a purely decentralized peer-to-peer currency into some-
thing that (ironically) more closely resembles the bank-intermediated pay-
ment systems of the past.  This paper explains how this transformation
creates complicated issues of loss allocation not anticipated by Bitcoin’s
founder.  Further, it argues for the need of an effective legal mechanism to
efficiently and fairly allocate losses between intermediaries and users.  The
first section of this paper will explain how Bitcoin transactions work when
users manage their own personal wallets, describing both the transaction
mechanics and risks of loss.  Then, it will explain how hosted wallet ser-
vices have changed these mechanics and risks, as well as why a set of loss
allocation rules is necessary.  Finally, the paper will recommend a set of
loss allocation rules based on the policy rationales that drive rules under
other existing payment systems law.
4. Nakamoto, supra note 3.
5. Id.
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I. BITCOIN’S BEGINNINGS: PERSONAL WALLETS AND
PURELY PEER-TO-PEER TRANSACTIONS
Bitcoin was created by Satoshi Nakamoto to offer the first digital ana-
logue of physical cash that truly did not require the involvement of any
intermediaries.6 As such, Nakamoto envisioned that each user could cre-
ate and manage her own personal wallet, as well as conduct transactions
using Bitcoin’s decentralized settlement process.  This section will explain
the mechanics of transactions conducted with personal wallets—that is,
without the presence of any intermediaries.
A. Transaction Mechanics
In most of the legal scholarship devoted to Bitcoin, it is common for
authors to engage in a cursory discussion about how bitcoin transactions
generally work before addressing the legal issues.  Such an approach will
not work here.  A deeper understanding of the specific nuts and bolts of
bitcoin transactions is necessary to engage in a meaningful discussion
about the risks of loss and how they should be allocated.  To do so without
resorting to overly abstract or technical language, the following subsec-
tions will walk the reader through the experiences of a fictional new
Bitcoin user, Adam, who decides to create a personal wallet, buy bitcoins
from a broker (also sometimes called simply a seller) named Beth, and use
those bitcoins to purchase a product from Charlie.
1. Getting Started: Adam Creates A Personal Wallet
When Adam decides he wants to start using Bitcoin, he creates a “per-
sonal wallet,” or a digital file that essentially serves as Adam’s own per-
sonal Bitcoin bank.  This file is either stored on his own computer offline
(a “cold” wallet) or online (a “hot” wallet).  Adam uses this wallet to gen-
erate addresses, or the destinations to which bitcoins can be sent.  Ad-
dresses are akin to bank accounts.  Just as banks can create a number of
different accounts, Adam’s wallet can create a number of different ad-
dresses to receive bitcoin.  For this example, suppose that Adam decides to
create an address for the bitcoins he is about to buy from Beth.  To do so,
he does the following:
1. Adam starts by generating a “private key,” which is a random string of
numbers and characters only he knows (here, it is “ADAMKEY1”).
2. Adam then uses ADAMKEY1 to generate the address, which is essen-
tially another string of numbers and characters (here,
“ADAMADDRESS1”).
As will be illustrated later, the private key and the address are inher-
ently linked together. Only someone who holds the private key corre-
sponding with a particular address can access the bitcoins in that address.
In a way, the private key is like the pin number to a bank account.
6. See generally id.
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2. Buying Bitcoin With Dollars: Adam Buys Bitcoin From Broker, Beth
In order to start conducting bitcoin transactions, Adam needs to first
buy some bitcoins with US dollars.  He finds a seller, Beth, who agrees to
sell him 100 bitcoins for $100.  Adam provides Beth the address,
ADAMADDRESS1, which he generated with ADAMKEY1 earlier.
Beth must now go online and run the Bitcoin software to initiate a transac-
tion—a set of instructions transmitted throughout the Bitcoin network for
the purpose of sending 100 bitcoins to ADAMADDRESS1.  The word
“send,” however, is misleading, as Beth does not actually send Adam any-
thing. Rather, she reassigns to Adam a set of 100 bitcoins she received in a
previously confirmed transaction or sets of transactions,7 as will be ex-
plained shortly.
a. Transaction initiation and transmission by Beth
The transaction (or set of instructions) that Beth initiates will have a
unique transaction ID—in this case, “BETHADAMTRANSACTION”—
and consists of an input, a digital signature, and an output.
1. Input:
For the input, Beth will reference the ID of a previously confirmed trans-
action in which someone else had routed 100 bitcoins to an address of her
own.  Here, imagine that in the previous month her friend Joe sent her 100
bitcoins to an address named “BETHADDRESS” in a transaction known
as “JOEBETHTRANSACTION.”  Beth will use JOEBETHTRANSAC-
TION as the input in her transaction with Adam.8 In plain English, Beth
is telling the network, “Here is an address where you will find 100 bitcoins
received from a previous transaction.”
2. Digital signature:
With her input, Beth includes a digital signature (call it “BETHSIG”) that
she generates with the same private key that generated BETHADDRESS
to prove she is the owner of that address.  In plain English, Beth is saying,
“I own the address I just referenced in the input, and so, I own these 100
bitcoins.”
3. Output:
For her output, Beth will use Adam’s address, ADAMADDRESS.
She will also specify an amount to be transferred, here, the full
7. Jeff Preshing, What Is a Bitcoin, Really?, PRESHING ON PROGRAMMING (Jan. 27,
2014), http://preshing.com/20140127/what-is-a-bitcoin-really/.
8. Note that it is not always this simple. There may be no previous transaction with
the exact amount that Beth might be looking for. In that case, she would need to include
multiple inputs referencing different previous transactions that add up to the correct amount.
For example, she might include as her inputs one transaction in which one of her addresses
was sent 20 bitcoins, as well as another transaction in which another one of her addresses was
sent 80 bitcoins.
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amount of 100 bitcoins.  In plain English, Beth is telling the network,
“I would like to send all of those 100 bitcoins, I just referenced, to
Adam’s address.”
After Beth initiates BETHADAMTRANSACTION with the input,
output, and digital signature, she transmits the transaction to the Bitcoin
network online for validation.  The following diagram illustrates the
mechanics of the transaction.
b. Transaction validation by a miner
After being transmitted through the network by Beth, the transaction,
known as BETHADAMTRANSACTION, must be “validated.”  Valida-
tion involves a two-step process conducted voluntarily by a user in the
Bitcoin network known as a “miner.”  Any user can be a miner and can
connect to the Bitcoin network like a telephone operator, using her com-
puter to listen for transaction requests across the entire network.9  Valida-
tion involves a two-step process:
9. Peter Van Valkenburgh, What Is Bitcoin Mining, and Why Is it Necessary?, COIN
CENTER (December 15, 2014), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-bitcoin-mining-and-why-
is-it-necessary.
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1. First, the miner checks the authenticity of Beth’s digital signature, BETH-
SIG, to ensure that BETHADDRESS belongs to Beth and that she was
the intended beneficiary in JOEBETHTRANSACTION.  Simply put,
BETHSIG will only be authentic if a specific mathematical equation is
satisfied by BETHADDRESS, JOEBETHTRANSACTION and BETH-
SIG.10 The miner uses her computer’s processing power to solve these
equations and verify BETHSIG.
2. Second, the miner checks to make sure that the 100 bitcoins from the
previous transaction Beth is referencing have not already been spent.  The
miner does this authentication by examining the public blockchain
ledger11 and making sure that JOEBETHTRANSACTION has not al-
ready been used as an input in another confirmed transaction (if it has,
then those particular 100 bitcoins have already been “spent”).12
Once these two steps have been completed and the miner deems the
transaction valid, the miner then proposes that BETHADAMTRANSAC-
TION should be published as a new entry, or a “transaction block,” in the
public blockchain ledger.  In a way, miners play the role of bank tellers:
inspecting checks, making sure all the appropriate signatures and account
numbers are there, checking the customer’s ID, and looking for proof that
the customer has enough cash-on-hand to fund the transaction.13
c. Confirmation of validation by the entire network
Of course, to stop there and publish/finalize the transaction upon a
single miner’s determination that it is valid would leave the opportunity
for miners to fraudulently publish blocks. For example, a fraudster can
initiate a fraudulent transaction and simply rush to mine and validate such
transaction herself.  To prevent fraud, Nakamoto designed Bitcoin so that
a miner’s proposed validated block will only become part of the chain
when it is confirmed by a majority of the miners in the network.
A miner’s block will only be confirmed and become a part of the chain
when a majority of the miners agree: (1) the transactions listed by the
miner are valid (in other words, no signatures from impersonators and no
double spending occurred) and (2) the miner correctly guessed a special
number that solves a particular math problem.14  Miners perform this
check by looking at the proposed block’s particular digital signature.  This
signature is a computer-generated product of three inputs: (1) the signa-
ture of the predecessor block, (2) a list of valid transactions from that
predecessor, and (3) a particular random number.15
10. Preshing, supra note 8.
11. The “blockchain” is a shared public ledger on which the entire Bitcoin network
relies. All confirmed transactions are included in the block chain. See BITCOIN.ORG, How
Does Bitcoin Work?, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works.
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All of these activities require a substantial amount of computer
processing power and electricity, so why would anyone volunteer to be-
come a miner?  The answer is that any miner who confirms a transaction
and publishes a new block on the blockchain ledger is rewarded with
bitcoins.16  In fact, the Bitcoin protocol gives this miner permission to re-
ward herself brand new bitcoins.17  Additionally, she may also receive vol-
untary transaction fees from the initiator of the transaction (from the
initiator’s point of view, these fees will incentivize more miners to confirm
the transaction and conduct settlement more quickly).18
3. Adam’s First Commercial Transaction With Bitcoin: Buying A
Product From Charlie
With the 100 new bitcoins he just bought from Beth, Adam is ready to
conduct his first commercial transaction: buying a product from Charlie.
Charlie quotes a price of 50 bitcoins for his product, and provides Adam
with his own address, “CHARLIEADDRESS”.
a. Transaction initiation and transmission by Adam
Adam initiates another transaction for his purchase of Charlie’s prod-
uct, known as ADAMCHARLIETRANSACTION, with the following:
1. Input:
For the input, Adam references BETHADAMTRANSACTION and the
underlying address, ADAMADDRESS1.  Here, Adam is essentially tell-
ing the network, “Here is an address where you will find 100 bitcoins re-
ceived from a previous transaction.”
2. Digital signature:
With his input, Adam includes a digital signature (here, ADAMSIG) that
he generates with ADAMKEY1.  Here, Adam is saying, “I own the ad-
dress I just referenced, and so, I own these 100 bitcoins.”
3. Output:
Here, Adam runs into a slight issue.  The transaction he references in the
input was for 100 bitcoins, but the product he is buying only costs 50
bitcoins—he needs change!  To do this, Adam simply uses his wallet to
create another private key to generate another address, ADAMAD-
DRESS2, which he will use to send himself back 50 bitcoins in change for
the product.  Thus, in the transaction Adam will have two outputs,
CHARLIEADDRESS for an amount of 50 bitcoins, and ADAMAD-
DRESS2 in the amount of 50 bitcoins.  Here, Adam is saying, “From the
100 bitcoins I just referenced, I would like to send 50 bitcoins to Charlie’s
address and 50 bitcoins to one of my own addresses.”
After Adam initiates BETHADAMTRANSACTION with the input,
outputs, and digital signature, he transmits it to the Bitcoin network online
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b. Transaction validation and update of the blockchain ledger by miners
As in ADAMBETHTRANSACTION, after being transmitted through
the network by Adam, the transaction known as ADAMCHARLIE-
TRANSACTION must be confirmed for it to be published on the
blockchain ledger and for final settlement between Adam and Charlie to
occur.  A miner or group of miners confirm the following:
1. First, the miner(s) checks the validity of ADAMSIG to ensure that Adam
owned ADAMADDRESS1 and to ensure that Adam was the intended
beneficiary in BETHADAMTRANSACTION.
2. Second, the miner(s) checks to make sure the 100 bitcoins in
BETHADAMTRANSACTION, referenced by Adam, have not already
been spent.  The miner(s) complete this check by examining the public
blockchain ledger and making sure BETHADAMTRANSACTION has
not already been used as an input in another confirmed transaction.
272 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:263
Once these two steps have been completed, the miner publishes
ADAMCHARLIETRANSACTION as a new “block” on the public
blockchain ledger, and settlement between Adam and Charlie is complete.
Charlie can now spend the bitcoins by creating a new transaction using
ADAMCHARLIETRANSACTION as the input, and so on.
B. Losses From Purely Peer-To-Peer Transactions
With transactions conducted with personal wallets, losses can occur
through a number of different scenarios as described below.
1. Risks Of Loss
a. User’s misplacement of private keys
A user will lose a set of bitcoins if she misplaces the private key corre-
sponding to the address holding such bitcoins.  As described in the previ-
ous section, a transaction must be signed with the right digital signature in
order to be deemed valid and to eventually get published in the
blockchain. Once a user loses the private key, she can no longer spend the
bitcoins because she loses her ability to generate the right digital signature
with which to sign transactions.  Indeed, as long as nobody finds the pri-
vate key, these bitcoins are probably lost forever.  To use the previous
example, if Adam lost or forgot that the key to ADAMADDRESS1 is
ADAMKEY1, he will forever lose the 100 bitcoins he received in
BETHADAMTRANSACTION because he will no longer be able to cor-
rectly sign any transaction using BETHADAMTRANSACTION as the
input.
b. Unauthorized transactions resulting
from the theft of user’s private keys
Another possible way for a user to lose bitcoins is if a thief steals the
private key associated with the address where those bitcoins are held.  The
thief can do this a number of ways depending on whether a wallet is a cold
or hot wallet and on the types of security procedures the user employs to
protect her wallet.  If a user’s wallet exists offline as a file on her com-
puter, the thief can steal the private key by stealing the entire computer
itself or seeing the key and recording it while the user is unaware.  If the
user’s wallet exists online, the thief can employ a variety of hacking meth-
ods to access her key.  In any case, once the thief controls the private key,
she can sign any number of unauthorized transactions to spend the
bitcoins held in the address or she can transfer the bitcoins to an address
of her own.  To use the previous example, suppose a thief, Tom, stole
Adam’s computer and found the contents of his wallet, including
ADAMKEY.  Tom can now sign any number of unauthorized transactions
with the digital signature generated by ADAMKEY, including sending the
bitcoins to his own address or spending them.
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c. “Double push” transaction by a fraudulent payer (rare)
Although extremely rare, a fraudulent payer can trick the payee into
providing a product or service for free by conducting a fraudulent “double
push” transaction.  In a “double push” transaction, the fraudulent payer
initiates and transmits two transactions simultaneously using the same in-
put bitcoins: one legitimate transaction where the output is the payee’s
address and another fraudulent transaction where the output is another
address owned by the payer.19  For the fraudulent transaction, the payer
includes an extremely high transaction fee to incentivize miners to validate
the fraudulent transaction more quickly than the, legitimate transaction.20
Thus, the legitimate transaction may be validated, but will eventually fail
to be confirmed because the fraudulent transaction will be confirmed and
published first.21  If the payee chooses not to wait for the legitimate trans-
action to be confirmed, she will provide the product or service before she
realizes that she did not actually get paid.22  By the time she realizes her
mistake, the fraudulent payer is nowhere in sight, having availed herself of
the payee’s product or service for free.
To use the previous example, suppose Adam wishes to defraud Char-
lie.  Adam initiates two transactions simultaneously—the legitimate trans-
action in which he pays Charlie, ADAMCHARLIETRANSACTION, and
an additional fraudulent transaction, ADAMFRAUDTRANS, in which he
uses one of his own addresses as the output to send the money back to
himself.  For ADAMFRAUDTRANS, Adam includes an extremely large
transaction fee so that miners will verify it quickly.  He then shows Charlie
that the transaction is verified and convinces him not to wait for confirma-
tion (in fact, many merchants choose not to wait for confirmation since it
can take hours and slow down the pace of business).  If Charlie decides
not to wait for confirmation before giving Adam the product, Adam’s
fraudulent transaction will eventually be confirmed, and Charlie will have
received nothing for his product.
d. “Double pull” transaction by a fraudulent payee (rare)
Finally, a fraudulent payee can trick the payer into paying twice by
conducting a “double pull” transaction.  In a double pull transaction, the
payee intercepts the payer’s transaction and slightly modifies the transac-
tion’s data structure so that the inputs and outputs remain the same, but
the transaction ID is slightly tweaked.23  If all the right conditions are in
19. See Christian Decker & Roger Wattenhofer, Bitcoin Transaction Malleability and
Mt. Gox, ARXIV (Mar. 26, 2014), https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6676; See also Michael Nielson,
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place, miners will confirm the tweaked transaction, while allowing the
fraudulent payee to claim that the intended transaction did not go through
based on the transaction ID.24  When that happens, the payee might con-
vince the payer to initiate another transaction using a different input.  If
she does, the fraudulent payee will have received two payments.
To use the previous example, suppose that Charlie wishes to defraud
Adam into paying him twice for the same product.  After Adam transmits
the transaction known as ADAMCHARLIETRANSACTION to the net-
work, Charlie intercepts it and modifies the ID ever so slightly without
changing its inputs or outputs.  For example, Charlie changes it to AD-
CHARTRANS. After ADCHARTRANS transaction is confirmed, Char-
lie would point out to Adam that no transaction named
ADAMCHARLIETRANSACTION was ever confirmed, and he would
ask Adam to try another payment using a different input.  Adam would
then create another transaction for the same amount.  When that second
transaction is confirmed, Charlie would have been paid twice.
2. Allocating Losses
 In each of the four scenarios, it should have been abundantly clear as to
which parties should and which parties will sustain the entirety of the loss.
In each scenario, there are at most two parties (the victim and the fraud-
ster).  The victim is the only party who bears the risk of loss and is the only
party in a position to manage such risk through adequate precautions.
There is no other party to whom the loss can be shifted.
In the first two scenarios, the user is the only one who can protect her
own private keys, either from misplacement or from theft.  In the third
scenario, it is entirely up to the payee to make sure that the intended
transaction was confirmed before rendering the product or service.  In the
fourth scenario, it is entirely up to the payer to make sure that the in-
tended transaction had not already been confirmed with a different ID
before paying the same amount twice in a separate transaction.
In a way, basic bitcoin transactions resemble transactions made with
hard cash because they are almost entirely peer-to-peer in nature.  This
illustrates why Bitcoin’s founder envisioned a system that obviated the
need for a set of rules of loss allocation or dispute mediation, lowering the
transaction costs across the system.25
II. BITCOIN’S MATURATION: THE RISE OF HOSTED WALLET SERVICES
AND INTERMEDIATED TRANSACTIONS
While personal wallets provide the user with total control over the
management of risks and security procedures (for better or for worse),
24. Danny Bradbury, What the ‘Bitcoin Bug’ Means: A Guide to Transaction Malleabil-
ity, COINDESK (Feb. 12, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-bug-guide-transac
tion-malleability/.
25. See Nakamoto, supra note 3.
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they also generate a degree of inconvenience.  Managing a personal wallet
involves a steep learning curve, especially for the less technologically
savvy users.  Running the Bitcoin software and conducting transactions is
not a user-friendly process.  For example, there is no slick visual interface
that tells users how  many bitcoins they own.  Instead, users must (them-
selves or with the help of a service) go through the blockchain ledger and
add up the different unspent transaction outputs in all of their addresses.
This inconvenience has spawned opportunities for third-party in-
termediaries to offer hosted wallet services with such friendly interfaces,
through which providers manage wallets for their users and help conduct
transactions on users’ behalf.  These wallets are stored in the cloud for use
online and through mobile devices.  Additionally, the wallets reduce the
friction of conducting basic transactions, such as buying bitcoins and using
them for commercial transactions.  While users who use these hosted wal-
let services enjoy a much more user-friendly and convenient bitcoin expe-
rience, they also must entrust a third-party intermediary to safeguard their
bitcoin holdings and to manage security issues.  This reliance on a third-
party intermediary fundamentally alters the mechanics of the underlying
transactions and the way the risk of loss is spread throughout the system.
A. Transaction Mechanics
To illustrate the differences in transaction mechanics between personal
wallets and hosted wallet services, this Section will revisit the previous ex-
ample involving Adam.  This Section, however, will walk through the ex-
ample as if Adam used the hosted wallet services of Coinbase, a leading
hosted wallet service intermediary that currently boasts over 5 million
users and 45,000 merchants.26
1. Getting Started: Adam Creates A Hosted Wallet
Adam decides to create a hosted wallet through an account with
Coinbase.  In addition to asking him to create his account credentials (user
name and password), Coinbase also asks Adam to link a source of funds,
such as a bank account or his debit or credit card.  When his setup is com-
plete, Adam can go to his accounts page on Coinbase and see a stream-
lined interface in which he can create hosted wallets.  Adam creates a
hosted wallet called AdamWallet.
26. COINBASE, INC., About Coinbase, COINBASE.COM https://www.coinbase.com/
about?locale=en (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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After Adam creates his hosted wallet, he notices that the interface lets
him see his Bitcoin address without showing him his private key.  Indeed,
upon looking through the user guides, he realizes that he does not have
access to the private keys of individual hosted wallets; instead, the private
keys are completely controlled by Coinbase.27  This is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the scenario in which Adam creates a personal wallet.  In that
case, Adam alone would create and manage the private keys that generate
the addresses for his transactions.
This brings up an extremely important question of bitcoin custody and
ownership.  Recall that the only way to prove ownership of the bitcoins in
a certain address is to sign the transaction using the digital signature gen-
erated with the private key linked to the address.  Since Adam does not
control the private key, does he not actually own the bitcoins in his wallet?
Coinbase holds most of its bitcoins (Adam’s and all of its users’) offline
in a consolidated virtual vault.28  In a way, Adam’s relationship with
Coinbase resembles the kind of relationship he would have with his bank
when he deposits cash—the bank holds on to the cash and issues a claim
for the amount of Adam’s deposit.  This exposes users to counterparty risk
they otherwise would not face with personal wallets, discussed later.
2. Buying Bitcoin With Dollars: Adam Buys Bitcoin From The
Intermediary
 Just like before, Adam needs to first buy some bitcoins with U.S. dollars
before he can conduct any commercial transactions.  Rather than having
to find a private seller such as Beth, however, Adam can simply use
Coinbase’s buy/sell feature to buy bitcoins from the intermediary’s bitcoin
stores.  In essence, Coinbase serves as a foreign exchange trader, allowing
Adam to buy and sell bitcoins with U.S. dollars at up-to-date market
prices rather than having to privately negotiate prices and terms with a
bitcoin seller like Beth.  Adam decides to buy 100 bitcoins using this buy/
sell feature.
27. See COINBASE, INC., Frequently Asked Questions, COINBASE.COM https://sup-
port.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/1526452-where-can-i-find-the-private-keys-for-
my-wallet- (last visited Apr. 10, 2017)
28. See COINBASE, INC., COINBASE.COM, https://www.coinbase.com/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2017).
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3. Adam’s First Commercial Transaction With Bitcoin: Buying A
Product From Charlie
With the 100 bitcoins that he just bought from Coinbase, Adam is
ready to conduct his first commercial transaction: buying a product from
Charlie that costs 50 bitcoins.  Unlike in the previous example, however,
Adam can use a streamlined send/request interface instead of having to
initiate a transaction and deal with inputs and outputs.  All he needs to do
is enter Charlie’s Bitcoin address or e-mail address.
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As Coinbase makes clear in its user agreement, however, Charlie must
have a Coinbase account in order for the transaction to work.29  If
Coinbase cannot find any account linked to the address that Adam pro-
vides, it will prompt Charlie to set up his own Coinbase account or else
void the transaction.30  Why would Coinbase impose this requirement?
The reason for this requirement is that Coinbase does not conduct this
transaction using Bitcoin network or the blockchain at all!  Rather, all
Coinbase does to effect a payment from Adam to Charlie is adjust the
bitcoin balances in both accounts to debit 50 bitcoins from Adam and
credit that same amount to Charlie (this is called an off-blockchain trans-
action).31  By conducting settlement between its users in house, Coinbase
can save on the fees that normally would have been paid to miners.
This example illustrates the fundamental differences in mechanics be-
tween a transaction conducted with a personal wallet and one conducted
with a hosted wallet.  In the former, a transaction is truly a peer-to-peer
process between Adam and Charlie: it involves collective settlement by
the users of the network without the involvement of any intermediaries.
In the latter, settlement involves a unilateral act by an intermediary—in
this case, Coinbase—where Coinbase updates its own internal ledger.
B. Losses From Intermediated Transactions
The types of losses that can occur with transactions made with hosted
wallet services are different than the losses that can occur with personal
wallets. Furthermore, unlike the losses incurred with personal wallets,
those incurred with hosted wallet services raise some significant issues of
loss allocation.
1. Risks Of Loss
a. Scenario 1: Unauthorized transactions resulting from theft of user’s
account credentials
An attacker who steals a user’s account credentials with a hosted wal-
let services provider (i.e. the username and password) can conduct unau-
thorized transactions with that account.  This is a much more serious
attack than the theft of a private key in a personal wallet.  Not only does
the attacker have free reign to spend the bitcoin in all of the victim’s ad-
dresses (and not just the one linked to a private key), but she can also steal
29. See COINBASE, INC., Coinbase User Agreement, COINBASE.COM https://
www.coinbase.com/legal/user_agreement?locale=en (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
30. See Id.
31. COINBASE, INC., Why Can’t I See My Transaction in the Blockchain?,
COINBASE.COM (July 21, 2016), https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/
1392055-why-can-t-i-see-my-transaction-in-the-blockchain-?b_id=13521.
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funds from the bank accounts that are linked to the hosted wallets.32
When such an attack occurs, significant issues must be resolved.
First, as a factual matter, it might not be clear who was at fault for the
stolen credentials.  Did the user fail to properly protect her credentials,
either by choosing a password that was too simple or by leaving the pass-
word unattended?  Were the stolen credentials the result of some sort of
attack orchestrated on the hosted wallet service provider?  Or did a fraud-
ulent employee of the hosted wallet service provider conduct the attacks?
Resolving this factual issue might take a great deal of fact-finding and due
diligence.
Moving past the factual issues of fault, who should bear the loss of
these unauthorized transactions?  With a traditional bank account or pay-
ment card, the bank or payment card company will generally return the
funds or reverse the charges resulting from an unauthorized transfer.33  In
contrast, hosted wallet intermediaries may disclaim responsibility for reim-
bursing users for the bitcoins that are stolen on their watch.  Is this fair?
Finally, there is an additional issue as to who should be responsible for
stopping the bleeding when credentials are compromised.  Unlike the theft
of a single private key, access to a user’s credentials gives the attacker free
reign to all the bitcoins in the user’s wallet . Thus, it is imperative for the
account to be shut down or frozen as soon as possible when an attack is
recognized.  Who should be responsible for recognizing the attack so that
the account can be frozen: the user or the service provider?
]b. Scenario 2: Large-scale theft of the intermediary’s private keys
Rather than target an individual user account, an attacker might find
that it makes much more sense to go after an intermediary’s entire bitcoin
store.  To do so, the attacker might try to breach the intermediary’s secur-
ity measures to steal a large number of the private keys held by the in-
termediaries.  There have been many documented cases of such large scale
breaches . For example, hackers stole roughly $350 million in bitcoins from
a hosted wallet intermediary, Mt. Gox, in early 2014 and around $70 mil-
lion from another intermediary called Bitfinex in 2016.34
Recall that users of hosted wallet services do not own the bitcoins in
their wallets, but rather the claim against the intermediary for the amount
of such bitcoins.  Thus, the users face massive counterparty risk when such
large scale losses occur; if the attack leaves the intermediary insolvent, the
user will walk away with nothing.  In these cases, users suffer losses even if
the breach occurred through no fault of their own (recall that the users
32. U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER ADVISORY: RISKS TO CONSUM-
ERS POSED BY VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, 5 (Aug. 2014), files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201408_cfpb_consumer-advisory_virtual–currencies.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Stan Higgins, The Bitfinex Bitcoin Hack: What We Know (And Don’t Know),
COINDESK (Aug. 3, 2016 6:49 PM) http://www.coindesk.com/bitfinex-bitcoin-hack-know-
dont-know/.
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have no access to the private keys and no responsibility over their safe-
keeping).  This fact raises the issue of fairness and consumer protection.
2. Allocating Losses
The tricky loss allocation issues raised above are currently resolved
contractually through the agreement that each user enters with the inter-
mediary.  In most cases, the intermediary disclaims liability for unautho-
rized transactions or places the burden on the user to prove that the
intermediary was at fault.  For example, with respect to Scenario 1,
Coinbase states that they “assume no responsibility for any loss that [a
user] may sustain due to compromise of account login credentials due to
no fault of Coinbase and/or failure to follow or act on any notices or alerts
that we may send to [the user].”35  In other words, Coinbase places the
burden of proving fault on the user—a very difficult task. As discussed in
the previous subsection, pinpointing the cause of unauthorized transac-
tions requires a good deal of fact finding and diligence that cannot be rea-
sonably expected of the user.  Users of Coinbase who noticed
unauthorized transactions depleting their bitcoin holdings have often been
left without any recourse.36
Resolution of loss allocation issued solely through such private agree-
ments is problematic.  First, such private agreements may lead to economi-
cally inefficient outcomes.  In the context of Bitcoin intermediaries, such
market failure necessitate legal intervention.  Leaving the effects of mar-
ket structure aside, it is unrealistic to believe that customers will negotiate
any of the loss allocation provisions to which they agree, since the cost of
negotiating such provisions typically exceeds the potential benefit to
them.37  To the extent that customers might “shop” around for better user
agreements rather than negotiate, negotiation costs are replaced with
search costs. Asymmetric information, furthermore, limits the effective-
ness of consumer shopping as users are unlikely to think about the liability
terms when opening an account.  Those that do will encounter largely in-
comprehensible legal jargon.  Second, the intermediaries are not bound by
consumer protection norms when they unilaterally decide on the loss allo-
cation terms in the user agreement that they enter into with their user.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE LOSS
ALLOCATION MECHANISM FOR BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS
As the previous section indicated, the rise of intermediation and
hosted wallet services creates a real need for an effective legal mechanism
35. See COINBASE, INC., Coinbase User Agreement, COINBASE.COM https://
www.coinbase.com/legal/user_agreement?locale=en (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
36. Russell Brandom, A String of Thefts Hits Bitcoin’s Most Reputable Wallet Service,
THE VERGE, (Feb. 7, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/7/5386222/a-string-of-
thefts-hit-coinbase-bitcoins-most-reputable-wallet-service.
37. Robert D. Cooter, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 63 (1987).
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for allocating losses from fraud, forgery, or error.  Even if losses can subse-
quently be shifted through private contractual arrangements, this mecha-
nism would serve as an important foundation for efficient and fair dispute
resolution.38  This section will attempt to define the contours of this mech-
anism, opting not to dwell on the specifics of how they should be drafted
and implemented into law.39  In doing so, the discussion will draw upon
the functions and policy purposes of the loss allocation mechanisms found
in existing payment system laws, namely Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C.
under state law and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act under federal law.
A. Overview Of Important Policy Considerations
Rather than using a single set of laws that covers all payment systems,
Congress and regulators have decided to tailor a different set of laws for
each major consumer payment system, even if such systems may serve sim-
ilar functions (for example, loss allocation rules for debit card transactions
differ from those for credit cards).40  The divergence of these laws reflect
the different choices made with respect to certain important policy ques-
tions.  Should the resolution method be based on flexible standards, rigid
rules, or both?  Upon what norms should the mechanism be based—eco-
nomic efficiency, consumer protection, or a balance of both?
1. Resolution Method: Standards, Rules, Or Both?
 The laws of each major payment system vary as to whether loss allocation
issues should be resolved with a mechanism based on flexible standards,
rigid rules, or a mix of both.  For checks on one hand, UCC Articles 3 and
4 employ a relatively complex negligence standard that requires ad hoc
investigation into the reasonableness of each party’s conduct.  Different
transactions require different levels of care to meet the reasonableness
standard, and insofar as negligence depends on the size of the potential
loss, the law of checks implicitly considers the amount at issue in deter-
mining the liability of the parties.41  For cards, on the other hand, the Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act and the Truth in Lending Act employ highly
tailored rules such as caps on customer liability. These provisions do not
take into consideration the circumstances of the individual transaction, the
level of care practiced by transaction parties, or the amount at issue.42
Clayton Gillette notes in his study of the divergence between the laws
of different payment systems that policy decision whether to resolve loss
38. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Con-
text: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 393 (2005).
39. After all, any regulation may disserve the objectives that it purportedly addresses
due to external factors, such as politics or historical accident, affecting the process, and
hence, the substance of formulation. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards and Precau-
tions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996).
40. Id. at 184.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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allocation issues based on flexible standards, rigid rules, or a mix of both
should depend on the capacity to strike a balance among the costs of draft-
ing, implementing, and enforcing the alternative formulations.43  As Gil-
lette notes:
“[P]recise directives are more appropriate when we have the greatest confi-
dence in our capacity to inform target actors (those at whom legal directives
are aimed), to describe antisocial forms of behavior (so that target actors
know the scope of permitted and prohibited activity), and to recognize the
occurrence of such behavior (for purposes of enforcement).  Uncertainty
about any of these factors warrants the use of less precise formulations.  For
instance, if the conditions under which antisocial behavior might arise are too
varied to be described ex ante, a precise rule that proscribes specific activities
will be less effective than a flexible standard in addressing the full range of
undesirable conduct.  Finally, we might seek a middle ground and include pre-
cise immunities or safe harbors if we believed that a vague legal standard
might over-deter desirable activity as people shy away from the boundaries of
potential liability.44
The choice of how precise to make loss allocation rules for commercial
transactions, thus, depends on the ability of those who make and apply the
law, as well as the ability of the targets of legal directives to define and
identify desirable and undesirable behavior.
2. Norms: Economic Efficiency And Consumer Protection
A related but equally important policy consideration is the choice of
norms upon which the loss allocation mechanism should be based.  On one
hand, the mechanism can aim for economic efficiency.  The goal of eco-
nomic efficiency provides that any loss allocation mechanism should pro-
vide incentives to the party best able to prevent the unauthorized payment
transaction at the lowest cost.45 On the other hand, the loss allocation
mechanism can be based on the norms of consumer protection, seeking to
protect consumers by limiting the liability they can incur.
These two norms are sometimes, but not always, in tension.  For exam-
ple, laws governing debit and credit card payments impose an arbitrary
$50 cap on the liability that can be incurred by a consumer, regardless of
the consumer’s level of care (for debit cards but not credit cards, liability
can increase depending on the consumer’s failure to report an unautho-
rized transaction after a specified period of time).46  But as Cooter points
out, holding the financial intermediary strictly liable for any loss beyond
the cap erodes the consumer’s incentive to take precaution and to refrain
43. Id. at 185.
44. Id. at 185-86.
45. Id. at 184. Gillette states that “[w]here multiple parties (i.e., either customers or
financial institutions) could take such precautions [against loss], regulations should, there-
fore, place the obligation on the party who can avoid the loss at the lowest cost.”
46. See Linda J. Rusch, Reimagining Payment Systems: Allocating Risk for Unautho-
rized Payment Inception, 83 CHI. KENT L. REV. 561, 581-83 (2008).
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from any action that would increase the loss, reducing economic
efficiency.47
B. Suggested Loss Allocation Mechanism For Intermediated Bitcoin
Transactions
Having described the important policy choices to consider when de-
signing a loss allocation mechanism, the discussion will now revisit the loss
allocation issues described in Section III.B and propose a legal mechanism
to resolve such issues.
1. Unauthorized Transactions Resulting From Theft Of User’s Account
Credentials
In situations where a malicious attacker steals the user’s account cre-
dentials to conduct unauthorized transactions, the intermediary should
bear all of the losses up to a certain small amount (say $200).  This should
be a strict liability rule that does not take into account the level of care
exercised by the user.
a. Strict liability rule placing liability on intermediary up to a certain
threshold
The burden of loss, at least up to a certain amount, should fall on the
intermediary rather than the user.  Consumer protection reasons aside,
this strict liability rule is justified under several principles of economic effi-
ciency identified by Cooter.  First, the principle of loss spreading dictates
that liability for a loss should be assigned to the intermediary because the
intermediary has greater economic resources and is in a better position to
predict the total volume of its losses, as well as spread these losses over a
large group of consumers.  In contrast, the user would have no ability to
spread a loss.48  Second, the principle of loss imposition dictates that the
loss allocation mechanism should be a strict liability rule rather than a
flexible standard based on fault, as decisive rules that clearly impose liabil-
ity would lower enforcement costs, which are deadweight costs to the sys-
tem.49  This is especially true because, as indicated earlier, many factual
issues must be resolved to determine fault in a particular occurrence of
loss.  It will not always be clear how an attacker got access to a user’s
credentials.  Opting for a flexible standard will most likely increase en-
forcement costs.
b. Strict liability rule placing liability on the user for any losses beyond
the threshold
Strict liability should fall on the user for any losses beyond the thresh-
old.  Such a liability rule will create an incentive for users to hold only as
47. Cooter, supra note 38 at 74.
48. Id. at 72.
49. Id. at 78.
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much bitcoins with the intermediary as they need for their immediate
transactions, while keeping the rest of their bitcoins in their own personal
wallet.  This aligns with Bitcoin security best practices, which dictate that
due to the irreversibility of bitcoin transactions and the potential for loss,
users should hold as much of their bitcoin in “cold” wallets offline.50
2. Large-Scale Theft Of The Intermediary’s Private Keys
Where loss occurs from a large-scale theft of the intermediary’s private
keys from a major security breach, the intermediary should bear all of the
loss.  Having exclusive control of the keys, the intermediary is the only
entity that can prevent the loss.  Fairness considerations dictate that the
user should not bear any loss for which she is not responsible.  Finally,
regulators should consider mandating insurance for intermediaries to miti-
gate users’ counterparty risk.  As incidents such as the Mt. Gox breach
showed, even a single large-scale theft of bitcoin can wipe out an interme-
diary’s reserves and make it insolvent, leaving users with no way to get
their money back.
IV. CONCLUSION
Every year, Bitcoin’s naysayers claim that the end of the virtual cur-
rency is near.  It is true that going forward, Bitcoin will face a number of
growing pains that its creator probably did not anticipate.  With the explo-
sive growth in transaction volume, there are concerns that the network will
become oversaturated and future transactions will take too long or be-
come too costly to process.51  Mining pools in China, formed by groups of
miners looking to consolidate computing power in order to exploit econo-
mies of scale, threaten to “control” the blockchain and compromise its
integrity.52  Other “coins” and virtual currencies modeled off Bitcoin
threaten to divide Bitcoin’s user base and weaken its impact.  Bitcoin,
nonetheless, has shown remarkable resilience and does not show signs of
slowing down, especially in its capacity as an alternative consumer pay-
ments system.
Still, as Bitcoin matures from a tech experiment into a bona fide con-
sumer payments system, the rise of intermediation and hosted wallet ser-
vices creates issues that Bitcoin’s founder did not anticipate.  In essence,
Bitcoin is slowly transforming from a purely peer-to-peer digital analogue
of cash into something that more closely resembles the intermediated sys-
tems of the past. On one hand, the presence of intermediaries is necessary
to attract new users, especially those less technologically savvy, and to
50. See BITCOIN.ORG, Securing Your Wallet, https://bitcoin.org/en/secure-your-wallet.
51. Chris Baranuik, Bitcoin: Is the crypto-currency doomed?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35343561.
52. Nathaniel Popper, How China Took Center Stage in Bitcoin’s Civil War, NY TIMES
(July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/dealbook/bitcoin-
china.html?_r=0.
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Bitcoin’s mainstream growth.  On the other hand, such intermediation can
fundamentally alter the nature of bitcoin transactions in a way that raises
new issues of loss allocation and dispute mediation.  Policymakers should
heed this changing dynamic and put in place a legal mechanism to resolve
these issues efficiently and fairly.
